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 1 
Thirteenth Amendment Optimism 
 
Jamal Greene
†
 
 
Introduction 
 
It has been proposed, including in this volume, that the Thirteenth 
Amendment may be read to prohibit not just slavery and involuntary servitude but 
also racial profiling,
1
 felony disenfranchisement,
2
 hate speech,
3
 child labor,
4
 child 
abuse,
5
 anti-abortion laws,
6
 domestic violence,
7
 prostitution,
8
 sexual harassment,
9
 
the use of police informants,
10
 anti-anti-discrimination laws,
11
 the denial of health 
care,
12
 the Confederate flag,
13
 the use of orcas at SeaWorld,
14
 and even laws 
                                                 
†
Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I thank David Barron, Andrew Koppelman, 
Lance Liebman, Alexander Tsesis, and symposium participants for helpful comments and 
discussion. Morenike Fajana provided excellent research assistance. 
1
 See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial Profiling, 
39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17 (2004). 
2
 See Darrell A.H. Miller, A Thirteenth Amendment Agenda for the Twenty-First Century: Of 
Promises, Power, and Precaution, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND 
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 291, 294 (Alexander Tsesis ed., 
2010) [hereinafter PROMISES OF LIBERTY]. 
3
 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992); Alexander Tsesis, Regulating Intimidating Speech, 41 HARV. J. LEGIS. 
389 (2004). 
4
 See Dina Mishra, Child Labor as Involuntary Servitude: The Failure of Congress to Legislate 
Against Child Labor Pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment in the Early Twentieth Century, 63 
RUTGERS L. REV. 59 (2010). 
5
 See Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment 
Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992). 
6
 See Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 NW. 
U. L. REV. 480 (1990). 
7
 See Marcellene Elizabeth Hearn, A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against 
Women Act, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (1998); Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: 
Hearings on S. 15 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 80 (1991) (statement of 
Burt Neuborne, Professor of Law, New York University) [hereinafter Neuborne]. 
8
 See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GEND. & L. 13, 16 
(1993). 
9
 See Jennifer L. Conn, Sexual Harassment: A Thirteenth Amendment Response, 28 COLUM. J. L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 519 (1994–1995). 
10
 See Robert L. Misner & John H. Clough, Arrestees as Informants: A Thirteenth Amendment 
Analysis, 29 STAN. L. REV. 713 (1977). 
11
 See David P. Tedhams, The Reincarnation of “Jim Crow:” A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis of 
Colorado’s Amendment 2, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 133 (1994). 
12
 See Akhil Reed Amar, Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School, Remarks at the Columbia 
Law Review Symposium: The Thirteenth Amendment: Meaning, Enforcement, and Contemporary 
Implications (Jan. 27, 2012). 
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 2 
permitting physician-assisted suicide.
15
 Many of these arguments are conceptually 
sound. Several are consistent in principle with the received wisdom regarding the 
original understanding of Section 2 of the amendment, which has been read to 
empower Congress to eliminate the “badges and incidents” of slavery.16 Most are 
no less reasonable than the proposition, still good law, that the Thirteenth 
Amendment may be read to prohibit private housing discrimination.
17
 Still, it is 
nearly self-evident that neither the current U.S. Supreme Court nor any presently 
imaginable U.S. Supreme Court is likely to accept any of the arguments just 
described. Indeed, the same is true of virtually any conceivable federal appellate 
panel or state supreme court, and so it is quite unlikely that this or any presently 
conceivable Supreme Court will be moved even to entertain these questions. And 
yet here we are. 
This article considers the uses of what I call Thirteenth Amendment 
optimism. Thirteenth Amendment optimism consists in arguing that the 
amendment prohibits in its own terms, or should be read by Congress to prohibit, 
practices that one opposes but that do not in any obvious way constitute either 
chattel slavery or involuntary servitude as those terms are ordinarily understood. 
It is not essential to Thirteenth Amendment optimism that the opposed practice be 
otherwise constitutionally permitted—laws banning abortions are not, for 
example—but it is essential that the claim would, at first blush, puzzle both 
                                                                                                                                     
13
 ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 137–49 (2004). 
14
 See The PETA Files, PETA Sues SeaWorld for Violating Orcas’ Constitutional Rights, 
http://www.peta.org/b/thepetafiles/archive/2011/10/25/peta-sues-seaworld-for-violating-orcas-
constitutional-rights.aspx. 
15
 Larry J. Pittman, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Dark Ward: The Intersection of the 
Thirteenth Amendment and Health Care Treatments Having Disproportionate Impacts on 
Disfavored Groups, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 774 (1998). 
16
 Such was the unanimous view of the Supreme Court that decided the Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3, 20 (1883); id. at 34–35 (Harlan, J., dissenting), though it is not the unanimous view of 
scholars. Compare Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States: Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 
203 (1951), with David P. Currie, The Civil War Congress, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1131, 1177–78 
(2006). Given that that Court applied this language in manifestly more narrow fashion than the 
Court that decided Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), one must wonder whether 
the term “badges and incidents” is polysemous and therefore misleading as precedent. See George 
A. Rutherglen, The Badges and Incidents of Slavery and the Power of Congress to Enforce the 
Thirteenth Amendment, in PROMISES OF LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 163, 164 (“The inherent 
ambiguity in this phrase is the key to understanding its role, initially in political thought and then 
in constitutional interpretation.”). Lawrence Sager attaches significance to the fact that Jones, 
unlike the Civil Rights Cases, includes within Congress’s remedial power the authority to target 
not just the “badges and incidents” but also the “relics” of slavery. See Lawrence G. Sager, A 
Letter to the Supreme Court Regarding the Missing Argument in Brzonkala v. Morrison, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 152 (2000). 
17
 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
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 3 
reasonable contemporary audiences and audiences contemporaneous with the 
adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
 Constitutional optimism, the broader set of which Thirteenth Amendment 
optimism is a subset, is common within our culture and indeed might be necessary 
to sustain democratic governance over time amid persistently divergent 
conceptions of the good.
18
 Such optimism is most prevalent in regard to the 
Constitution’s “ink blots”:19 the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, 
and the Ninth Amendment most especially.
20
 What is odd about Thirteenth 
Amendment optimism is its prevalence notwithstanding that the amendment 
appears to state a proposition that better approximates a rule than a principle. It 
refers to three specific practices—slavery, involuntary servitude, and punishment 
for crime—the scope of which was well understood (indeed, too-well understood) 
at the time of the amendment’s adoption and which remains well understood 
today. The proposition that private use of racial slurs or a state prohibition on 
abortion qualifies as slavery or may be regulated as such does not merely feel 
technically incorrect as a matter of current legal doctrine; it intuitively seems to 
misunderstand the English language and the terms of art used within it. 
 Of course, much Thirteenth Amendment optimism fits within the best 
traditions of academic argument—the claims are interesting precisely because and 
to the degree to which they are counterintuitive, exposing our hunches to the 
rigors of principle.
21
 It is worth pondering, however, whether Thirteenth 
Amendment optimism is anything more than academic. We are gathered to 
discuss the amendment’s contemporary implications within this universe, not an 
alternate one of our clever imaginings, but the non-academic payoff of Thirteenth 
                                                 
18
 See JACK BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 10 (2011); Robert Cover, Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 68 (1983); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the 
Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 350–51 (2001); cf. 
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 16 (1999). 
19
 The term, of course, is Robert Bork’s. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 166 
(1990) (“A provision whose meaning cannot be ascertained is precisely like a provision that is 
written in Sanskrit or is obliterated past deciphering by an ink blot.”); Nomination of Robert H. 
Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 117, 249 (1989) (testimony of Robert H. Bork) (“[I]f you 
had an amendment that says ‘Congress shall make no’ and then there is an ink blot and you can 
not read the rest of it and that is the only copy you have, I do not think the court can make up what 
might be under the ink blot if you can not read it.”). 
20
 See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33 
(1969) (quipping that, like gin, we “come close to using . . . the three celebrated prohibitory 
clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment” “for everything”); cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 
(1927) (calling tailoring arguments grounded in the Equal Protection Clause “the usual last resort 
of constitutional arguments”). 
21
 But see Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever By Half: The Problem with Novelty in Constitutional Law, 
95 NW. U. L. REV. 921, 926 (2001) (criticizing the phenomenon that “proposing counterintuitive 
ideas is the fastest way up the academic ladder”). 
 4 
Amendment optimism is not obvious. As Andrew Koppelman writes of his own 
argument, “[i]f you want to be taken seriously, you had better not make a 
Thirteenth Amendment argument on behalf of abortion.”22 Koppelman is quite 
right to suggest that any lawyer advancing such an argument before an actual 
court would sacrifice his credibility and would therefore be making a strategic 
(though perhaps not sanctionable) error. There may literally be no person, 
moreover, who currently believes that laws proscribing abortion are 
constitutionally permitted but would change his mind upon hearing Koppelman’s 
argument. And those who already believe abortion is constitutionally protected 
have no obvious need for Koppelman’s intervention. Part I generalizes that 
observation to other instances of Thirteenth Amendment optimism: it is almost 
uniformly unlikely to persuade a court or anyone who supports the challenged 
practice, and it is gravy to those who already oppose the practice. If Thirteenth 
Amendment optimism is indeed unpromising, insufficient, and unnecessary, then 
is it worth its weight in law review pages?
23
 
 This essay does not attempt a complete answer to that question, but it 
offers, in Part II, a qualified reason for optimism about Thirteenth Amendment 
optimism. Successful creative uses of the Thirteenth Amendment in support of 
progressive arguments demonstrate not that the amendment’s definition of slavery 
is limitlessly malleable but rather that its broad empowerment of Congress lends 
constitutional support to political imagination. Part II focuses in particular on the 
Progressive-era “Labor Constitution” discussed in detail in the work of James 
Gray Pope.
24
 By placing affirmative rights within a constitutional register, the 
Thirteenth Amendment can arm advocates with a powerful rhetorical resource. It 
thereby supplies to progressives what interpretivism has long supplied to 
conservatives: a language for arguing that the Constitution inspires, and perhaps 
even compels, their political objectives. Thirteenth Amendment optimism is, in 
this sense, a potential tool for progressive political mobilization. 
 But it is a limited tool, best deployed in legislative rather than judicial 
advocacy, and best tied to Section 2 of the amendment rather than Section 1. 
Thirteenth Amendment optimism about the self-executing scope of Section 1 may 
in some cases have significant epistemic or historical value, but such arguments 
have no other contemporary relevance and make little strategic sense. Affirmative 
rights arguments are not well-suited to judicial identification and development, 
                                                 
22
 Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor Revisited: The Thirteenth Amendment and Abortion, in 
PROMISES OF LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 226, 227. 
23
 See Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 979 (2004) 
(“Most . . . commentators . . . not to mention lawyers, judges, and politicians, dismiss [scholarly 
Thirteenth Amendment] musings as academic flights of fancy—the kinds of things only law 
professors, unconnected to reality, would think worth pursuing.”). 
24
 See James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the 
Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921–1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 5 
and creative judicial use of Thirteenth Amendment optimism can have unintended 
consequences. Part II argues, for example, that Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the 
most celebrated case among Thirteenth Amendment optimists, may have been a 
mistake for their cause.
25
 Jones did not need the Thirteenth Amendment to reach 
its result, it did not generate expansive Thirteenth Amendment case law, and it 
squandered an opportunity to build on a well-developed line of cases repudiating 
the state action doctrine. 
 Part III returns, tentatively, to the examples from Part I to suggest ways in 
which Thirteenth Amendment arguments may be useful in motivating progressive 
politics while avoiding some of the costs associated with addressing creative 
progressive arguments to judges. 
  
I 
 
The Thirteenth Amendment is fool’s gold. Part of its allure is that it does 
not mean what it says. Its first section prohibits the existence of “slavery” and 
“involuntary servitude,” except as a punishment for a crime, “within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”26 Compulsory military service 
does not count as involuntary servitude
27
 but being made to perform a service one 
has agreed contractually to perform does count.
28
 The second section of the 
Thirteenth Amendment endows Congress with “power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.”29 According to the Supreme Court, Congress exceeded 
this authority when it tried to ban racial discrimination in public 
accommodations,
30
 a frequent target of criticism during Reconstruction,
31
 but it 
did not exceed this authority in banning racial discrimination in wholly private 
real estate transactions, a practice that was rampant in the North during 
Reconstruction and that was not specifically discussed in the debates over the 
relevant statute.
32
 
                                                 
25
 Jones is, of course, a Section 2 case, but as Part II explains, it did not rest on a political 
infrastructure. 
26
 U.S. Const. amend. XIII §1. 
27
 See Arver v. United States, 244 U.S. 366 (1918). 
28
 See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911). 
29
 U.S. Const. amend. XIII §2. 
30
 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
31
 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at 368–
72 (1988); PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION 62 (1999). 
32
 See Jones, 392 U.S. at 454–73 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Gerhard Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, 
Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 89, 104; Louis Henkin, On Drawing Lines, 82 
HARV. L. REV. 63, 84–86 (1968). 
 6 
 It has been said, fallaciously it appears,
33
 that the Chinese word for 
“crisis” is a compound of “danger” and “opportunity.” The danger, which some 
would call a crisis, in constitutional text not governing constitutional meaning is 
that it invites judges to commandeer the Constitution. But that invitation is also, 
of course, an opportunity. It is this opportunity that motivates Thirteenth 
Amendment optimism. This Part discusses three examples: Koppelman’s abortion 
argument; Akhil Amar’s arguments that the Thirteenth Amendment applies to 
child abuse and hate speech; and Marcellene Hearn’s and Burt Neuborne’s claims 
that Title III of the Violence Against Women Act was valid Thirteenth 
Amendment legislation. I use these arguments as archetypes in part because the 
deservedly respected status of their proponents requires that they be taken 
seriously.
34
 (One needn’t be a fool to fall for fool’s gold.) This Part summarizes 
the arguments and explains, in brief, why I believe none is doctrinally promising, 
likely to persuade opponents of the underlying policy target, or necessary to 
convince its proponents. 
 
A. Abortion 
 
 It is appropriate to begin with Koppelman because the notion that the most 
vexing constitutional question of our time may be resolved by reference to the 
text of the Thirteenth Amendment is, as Koppelman recognizes,
35
 optimism on 
steroids. The argument, though, is straightforward. To subject a woman (or her 
physician) to criminal penalties if she elects to terminate a pregnancy is to 
conscript her into bearing a child and becoming a mother against her will.
36
 
Because abortion laws regulate women most directly, moreover, they “define 
women as a servant caste,” which Koppelman describes as “the same kind of 
injury that antebellum slavery inflicted on blacks.”37 The style of the argument is 
textualist and, broadly speaking, originalist and doctrinal. The claim that 
                                                 
33
 See Victor H. Mair, Pīnyīn.info: a guide to the writing of Mandarin Chinese in romanization, 
http://pinyin.info/chinese/crisis.html. 
34
 Indeed, one federal appellate court has cited Koppelman’s argument (in addition to related 
arguments advanced by Laurence Tribe and Donald Regan) as evidence that applying the 
Thirteenth Amendment to abortion rights is not frivolous, on which basis the district court had 
awarded attorney’s fees to the state of Utah. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1515 n.9 (10th 
Cir. 1995). 
35
 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
36
 Koppelman is far from the first abortion rights proponent to invoke the Thirteenth Amendment, 
but his argument is more detailed than most. For other discussions, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 15-10, at 1354 n.113 (2d ed. 1988), and Donald H. Regan, 
Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1619 (1979). For examples of the use of 
Thirteenth Amendment arguments by advocates, see Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s Roots: The Women’s 
Rights Claims That Engendered Roe, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1875, 1884 n.34, 1891, 1896 n.98 (2010). 
37
 Koppelman, supra note 6, at 485. 
 7 
involuntary servitude encompasses “the control of the labor and services of one 
man for the benefit of another, and the absence of a legal right to the disposal of 
his own person, property and services”38 is an appeal to the common sense 
meaning of the phrase, is consistent with the original meaning of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, and appears verbatim in the U.S. Reports.
39
 No Supreme Court 
decision has applied this language to abortion rights, and there is no reason to 
believe that any American living in 1865 would have thought it applicable to 
abortion rights, but neither of those objections is dispositive within mainstream 
versions of both originalism and living constitutionalism. 
 In a recent book chapter revisiting his original article, Koppelman invites 
readers to explain the defect in his argument, which no one has done to his 
satisfaction.
40
 But the answer, I think, has already been suggested by John 
McGinnis. McGinnis writes: “It is not only that no reasonable person at the time 
would have thought that unwanted pregnancy was a form of involuntary 
servitude. Even now such an argument would be treated at best as a pun on labor 
rather than seriously advanced in a court of law.”41 Koppelman answers this 
charge with the familiar objection that specific-intent originalism would require 
the preservation of laws requiring segregated schools and banning 
miscegenation.
42
 The difference is that the constitutional attack on segregated 
schools and anti-miscegenation laws proceeds from analysis of the Equal 
Protection Clause, which does not lend itself to specific-intent application. We 
can contrast the Equal Protection Clause with the congressional age requirement 
or the presidential oath, which few argue could be replaced by something 
practically equivalent but not contemplated by the founding generation.
43
 
Koppelman’s burden is to show why slavery and involuntary servitude are more 
like the Equal Protection Clause and less like the age requirement or the oath.  
Meeting this burden is hardly a conceptual impossibility but it does not 
seem true either to original expectations about the words themselves or, more 
significantly, to the way we think of the words today.
44
 The Supreme Court has 
spoken to these questions. Thirteenth Amendment optimists often cite the 
Slaughter-House Cases, in which Justice Miller wrote for the majority that “while 
                                                 
38
 Id. at 486. 
39
 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896).  
40
 Koppelman, supra note 22, at 235. 
41
 John O. McGinnis, Decentralizing Constitutional Provisions Versus Judicial Oligarchy: A 
Reply to Professor Koppelman, 20 CONST. COMM. 39, 56 (2003). 
42
 Koppelman, supra note 22, at 235. 
43
 Cf. Richard Primus, Constitutional Expectations, 109 MICH. L. REV. 91, 92–93 (2010) (using 
the presidential oath, which is never in fact read verbatim, as an example of ways in which our 
“expectations” about constitutional practice may supplement or substitute for text). 
44
 Jack Balkin has argued that originalism should pay careful attention to the level of specificity at 
which a constitutional command was originally understood. See BALKIN, supra note 18, at 229. 
 8 
negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the 
thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter.”45 This 
reminder does not speak to the important question of the level of specificity at 
which we should understand “slavery,” though the Slaughter-House Court was 
quite clear that the term was bound up with the practice of chattel slavery.
46
 The 
Court was more direct in Robertson v. Baldwin,
47
 in which it held that the 
Amendment does not apply to seamen contracts: 
 
The prohibition of slavery, in the Thirteenth Amendment, is well known to 
have been adopted with reference to a state of affairs which had existed in 
certain States of the Union since the foundation of the government, while 
the addition of the words “involuntary servitude” were said in the 
Slaughterhouse cases, to have been intended to cover the system of 
Mexican peonage and the Chinese coolie trade, the practical operation of 
which might have been a revival of the institution of slavery under a 
different and less offensive name. It is clear, however, that the amendment 
was not intended to introduce any novel doctrine with respect to certain 
descriptions of service which have always been treated as exceptional; 
such as military and naval enlistments, or to disturb the right of parents 
and guardians to the custody of their minor children or wards.
48
 
 
This reasoning was formally, if cryptically, extended to the military draft shortly 
after the Robertson case.
49
 Compulsory military service is not “involuntary 
servitude” because, well, it just isn’t. As Koppelman notes, “the bounds of 
legitimate legal argument are not set by rules but by custom and usage,”50 and we 
are unaccustomed to using Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment in the way he 
proposes. 
                                                 
45
 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873). 
46
 See id. at 71–72. 
47
 165 U.S. 275 (1897). 
48
 Id. at 282 (internal citations omitted). 
49
 Justice White wrote for a unanimous Court in Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918): 
 
[W]e are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government from the 
citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of 
the rights and honor of the nation, as the result of a war declared by the great 
representative body of the people, can be said to be the imposition of involuntary 
servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
 
Id. at 390. Unless we understand the Thirteenth Amendment to describe a term of art, the Court’s 
failure of imagination baffles. 
50
 Koppelman, supra note 22, at 238. 
 9 
 Koppelman, as noted, is keen to the charge that his argument is a doctrinal 
nonstarter. In his book chapter he cites Katherine Taylor’s conclusion that courts 
are more likely to be sympathetic to an equal protection argument against abortion 
restrictions than a Thirteenth Amendment challenge.
51
 Koppelman expresses 
optimism, though, that the proliferation of Thirteenth Amendment optimism (my 
term, not his) may give his argument more doctrinal credibility.
52
 But Taylor’s 
challenge may be read as more than just skepticism about courts. Arguments 
grounded in equality are also both more likely to be adopted by abortion rights 
proponents and sufficient to persuade them that their position is constitutionally 
sound. 
 
B. Child Abuse and Hate Speech 
 
In separate Harvard Law Review articles written two decades ago, Amar 
made the case that the Thirteenth Amendment does indeed establish a broad anti-
slavery constitutional regime that, accordingly, permits its language to extend to 
child abuse and to hate speech.
53
 I consider these arguments together because 
Amar appears to have conceptualized them contemporaneously. Amar’s stature as 
a constitutional law scholar derives directly from two features of his 
scholarship—creativity and historical rigor—that reward attention to his 
Thirteenth Amendment arguments. Consistent with his constitutional positivism, 
his approach is to offer a conception of “slavery” that constitutes “a working 
definition suitable for judges and exemplified (though not necessarily exhausted) 
by the peculiar historical practices the Amendment was plainly meant to 
abolish.”54 For him, chattel slavery serves as the paradigm case, but slavery 
within the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment is more broadly “[a] power 
relation of domination, degradation, and subservience, in which human beings are 
treated as chattel, not persons.”55 Accordingly, an abused child with no right of 
exit is analogous to a slave: “Like an antebellum slave, an abused child is subject 
to near total domination and degradation by another person, and is treated more as 
a possession than as a person.”56 
Child abuse in the absence of actions a court is prepared to recognize as 
being under the color of state law is not constitutionally prohibited. The Court in 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,
57
 which so held, 
                                                 
51
 Id. (citing Katherine A. Taylor, Compelling Pregnancy at Death’s Door, 85 COLUM. J. GENDER 
& L. 85, 146 n.198 (1997)). 
52
 See id. 
53
 Amar & Widawsky, supra note 5; Amar, supra note 3. 
54
 Amar & Widawsky, supra note 5, at 1365 n.18. 
55
 Id. at 1365. 
56
 Id. at 1364. 
57
 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 10 
did not view the negligence of Wisconsin public officials as rising to the level of 
state action sufficient to render the state federally liable for the horrific abuse 
suffered by Joshua DeShaney at the hands of his father.
58
 The case for finding 
state action in DeShaney is not difficult to articulate, and indeed Amar and his co-
author in the child abuse article make the case themselves: by structuring its 
family law so as to prevent Joshua from leaving his father’s abusive home, 
Wisconsin effectively imprisoned him.
59
 One problem with this theory is that it is 
limitless, potentially seeing state action underlying virtually every otherwise 
private transaction, but this is a familiar problem in the law of state action, 
considered and occasionally overcome in several cases since Shelley v. 
Kraemer.
60
 The prospect that any court rejecting this theory would nonetheless 
feel moved by Amar’s and Widawsky’s Thirteenth Amendment argument is 
beyond dim. To imagine such a court is to imagine a judge or set of judges 
bothered by the slippery slope problem of finding state action in DeShaney but 
unbothered by the complexity in applying Amar’s and Widawsky’s theory to 
ordinary parent-child relationships,
61
 domestic labor by minors, numerous 
instances of common criminal behavior,
62
 apprenticeships, workplace harassment, 
domestic abuse among adults, and not an insignificant number of judicial 
clerkships. Again, there is no conceptual problem with using slavery as a 
metaphor to describe these relationships, but Amar and Widawsky, like 
Koppelman, do not make a persuasive case that the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
language was intended to be metaphorical.
63
 
                                                 
58
 Id. at 195–98. 
59
 Amar & Widawsky, supra note 5, at 1362. 
60
 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (finding state 
action in a private civil litigant’s racially discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges); Evans 
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (finding state action in the transfer of a park between private 
entities under a segregation covenant). 
61
 See Robertson, 165 U.S. at 282 (stating that the Thirteenth Amendment “was not intended . . . to 
disturb the right of parents and guardians to the custody of their minor children or wards”). 
62
 Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 213 (1995) (“DeShaney’s case could just as readily 
be analogized to one in which a mugger beats up his victim in the presence of a police officer who, 
having been inadequately trained, is unable to prevent the crime.”). 
63
 See id. at 212 (“[I]t does not follow that every relation that is brutal, degrading, and 
dehumanizing is a form of slavery, any more than it follows from the fact that all judges are wise 
that all wise men are judges.”). In fact, Amar and Widawsky discuss some historical instances of 
cross-comparison between the master-slave and the parent-child relationship. For example, during 
the congressional debate over passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, several members of 
Congress drew analogies between these relationships. See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 5, at 
1367 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1864) (statement of Rep. Fernando 
Wood); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1865) (statement of Rep. Chilton White); CONG. 
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1636 (1862) (statement of Rep. Samuel Shellabarger). None of the 
statements Amar and Widawsky cite make the case that anyone of consequence believed the 
Thirteenth Amendment would in fact cover such parental relationships, and two come from 
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Amar originally advanced his argument that the Thirteenth Amendment 
might be invoked to prohibit certain forms of hate speech in an article responding 
to the Court’s decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.64 The R.A.V. Court 
invalidated a municipal ordinance that, as construed by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, banned symbolic “fighting words” that were based on race, color, creed, 
religion, or gender. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion held that, with limited 
exceptions, a government could not engage in content-based regulation even 
within a category of unprotected speech (like fighting words).
65
 The concurring 
opinion of Justice White objected to the majority’s reasoning but would have 
invalidated the statute as substantially overbroad.
66
 For Amar, the missing piece 
in all of the opinions in the case was any discussion of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, including the Thirteenth. Even if the state may not generally 
regulate race-based fighting words, perhaps, Amar argued, it might do so by 
specifically invoking the Thirteenth Amendment and its commitment to the 
eradication of the badges and incidents of slavery.
67
 
 This provocation makes for scintillating scholarship and, not incidentally, 
it leaves much room for quibbling.
68
 Since my concerns are largely external to 
Amar’s argument, I wish to focus on an aspect of R.A.V. to which he himself 
draws the reader’s attention: the vote lineup. Amar notes that three of the four 
Justices in the minority—Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens—had voted to 
uphold race-based affirmative action plans,
69
 while no member of the majority 
had done so.
70
 The concurring Justices also tended to invoke the specifics of the 
case before them,
71
 which involved white teenagers burning a cross on the lawn of 
a black family that had moved into a predominantly white neighborhood. These 
                                                                                                                                     
opponents of the amendment and so do not represent especially reliable evidence of its intended 
scope.  
64
 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
65
 Id. at 383–84. 
66
 Id. at  411 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
67
 Amar, supra note 3, at 155–60. 
68
 For a general critique, see Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. 
L. REV. 1639, 1647–56 (1992). 
69
 Justice O’Connor’s later vote in favor of the University of Michigan Law School’s plan in 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), means that all four Justices who refused to join the 
majority opinion in R.A.V. have voted to uphold affirmative action plans. 
70
 This is no longer so, as Justice Souter dissented in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995), and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), and voted with the majority in Grutter. 
R.A.V. was decided at the end of Justice Souter’s second term, and there is some evidence that 
Supreme Court Justices engage in unstable voting patterns early in their careers. See Lee Epstein, 
Kevin Quinn, Andrew D. Martin, & Jeffrey A. Segal, On the Perils of Drawing Inferences About 
Supreme Court Justices From Their First Few Years of Service, 91 JUDICATURE 168 (2008). The 
authors conclude that Souter in particular made a “180-degree turn[] from the preferences revealed 
in [his] first few terms.” Id. at 177. 
71
 See Amar, supra note 3, at 150. 
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facts tend to support Amar’s view, with which I agree, that “the [Justice] White 
Four may simply have more tolerance for minority-protective laws.”72 
Recall, though, that the judgment in R.A.V. was unanimous, and it was not 
so for want of a better argument for regulating racist hate speech. As noted, the 
concurring Justices believed that the St. Paul ordinance was substantially 
overbroad, and they were right. The ordinance as construed by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court conflated “displays that one knows or should know will create 
anger, alarm or resentment based on racial, ethnic, gender or religious bias” with 
the “fighting words” recognized in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire73 as 
unprotected speech. This was not a fair reading of the Court’s doctrine, especially 
since Chaplinsky:
74
 as Justice White wrote, “[t]he mere fact that expressive 
activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression 
unprotected.”75 Reliance on the Thirteenth Amendment, even if otherwise 
doctrinally viable, would have at best made the ordinance slightly less overbroad, 
and indeed might have made it more overbroad in view of the fact that the 
ordinance was not limited to race-based fighting words.
76
 
There is every reason to believe that the concurring Justices would have 
voted to uphold a more narrowly drawn statute under standard First Amendment 
principles. Justice White’s opinion calls the majority opinion “transparently 
wrong”77 because fighting words are categorically exempt from First Amendment 
scrutiny: a content-based restriction on fighting words is no more problematic 
than a content-based restriction on assault.
78
 Two of the concurring Justices—
Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor—voted a decade later to uphold a Virginia 
statute that banned cross-burning with intent to intimidate.
79
 Although that statute 
did not single out race-based intimidation, Justice White’s R.A.V. concurrence 
suggests that, for Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor, it would not have 
changed the result if it had.
80
 
First Amendment doctrine has resources for addressing hate speech that 
anyone within the American mainstream is inclined to declare regulable: it can be 
                                                 
72
 Id. at 147. 
73
 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
74
 See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Terminiello 
v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
75
 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 413 (White, J., concurring). 
76
 Amar appears to recognize this problem: in a footnote, he drafts a “more defensible” ordinance 
that is tied much more specifically to the Thirteenth Amendment. See Amar, supra note 3, at 160 
n.187. Amar’s proposed legislation includes “gender subordination” as a “badge of slavery,” but 
he seems to view it as a close question. See id. at 159. 
77
 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 398 (White, J., concurring). 
78
 See id. at 400–01; cf. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 
79
 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
80
 Justice Stevens said so expressly in Black. See id. at 368 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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labeled conduct,
81
 fighting words,
82
 a true threat,
83
 or perhaps could be regulated 
under the captive audience
84
 or secondary effects doctrines.
85
 Advocates, 
including Amar,
86
 have suggested that the imperatives of the Fourteenth 
Amendment might justify regulation of hate speech notwithstanding the First 
Amendment’s protections for expressive activity.87 That the Court has tended not 
to find these avenues compelling is not for want of clever argumentation. Those 
inclined to uphold hate speech regulation will be happy to use the existing tools. 
Those inclined not to do so are unlikely to accept Amar’s invitation to craft a new 
doctrine based on a nineteenth-century constitutional amendment addressed most 
evidently to state-enforced ownership of human beings. 
 
C. The Violence Against Women Act 
 
The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) provided a federal civil 
remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence. The Supreme Court invalidated 
this provision of VAWA in United States v. Morrison on the grounds that it 
exceeded the power of Congress under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
88
 The Court held that VAWA’s civil enforcement 
provision was not valid Commerce Clause legislation because it regulated non-
economic activity and that it was not valid Section 5 legislation because it 
targeted private rather than state action. Marcellene Hearn and Burt Neuborne 
separately have argued that the Thirteenth Amendment, which has no state action 
trigger, could have supplied the missing jurisdictional hook.
89
 Specifically, and 
consistent with Amar’s argument as to child abuse, Congress could regard 
domestic violence as a badge or incident of a power relationship akin to that of 
master and slave.
90
 
                                                 
81
 See id. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487. 
82
 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568. 
83
 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). 
84
 See J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295 (1999). 
85
 See Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41 (1985); 
Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th 28 (1st App. Dist. 1996) (adopting a 
secondary effects rationale to reject a First Amendment challenge to an injunction against racial 
harassment in the workplace). 
86
 Amar, supra note 3, at 51–55 
87
 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 193 (1993); Thomas 
C. Grey, Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties: The Case of Discriminatory Verbal Harassment, 63 J. 
HIGHER EDUC. 485, 487 (1992); Charles R. Lawrence, Crossburning and the Sound of Silence: 
Antisubordination Theory of the First Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REV. 787 (1992). 
88
 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
89
 See Hearn, supra note 7; Neuborne, supra note 7. 
90
 See Hearn, supra note 7, at 1144; see also Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered 
Women, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEM. 207 (1992) 
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Hearn’s argument is both textualist and originalist.91 She argues, first, that 
domestic violence, rape, and sexual assault constitute involuntary servitude and, 
second, that violence against women is a badge and incident of nineteenth-century 
coverture.
92
 Common law coverture rules still in effect at the time of the 
Thirteenth Amendment subjected married women to domination and control by 
their husbands, and violence within marriage was typically both legal and 
expected.
93
 This connection was not lost on opponents of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, some of whom suggested concern (feigned, perhaps) that the 
proposed amendment might alter the marital relationship.
94
 Neuborne’s argument, 
which he offered in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee during the 
drafting of VAWA, is less specific but equally bold: “To the extent pervasive 
gender-based violence is denying women an equal status in society, it is precisely 
analogous to the badges and incidents of Afro-American slavery swept away by 
Congress and the courts in the cases following Jones v. Mayer.”95 
These arguments are subject to prudential objections not unlike the 
objections to Amar’s and Widawsky’s child abuse argument, though here they 
may be even more formidable. Certainly the psychological coercion that keeps 
women in abusive relationships may contribute to a form of involuntary servitude, 
and rape is, paradigmatically, the violent exploitation of a power relationship; the 
woman is quite literally enslaved by her attacker. Moreover, the connection 
between common law rules that permitted husbands to inflict corporal punishment 
upon their wives and more modern lapses in prosecution of domestic violence is 
demonstrable.
96
 But once we relax or reconceptualize the constraint that slavery 
                                                                                                                                     
(arguing that battered women are subjected to a form of involuntary servitude cognizable under 
the Thirteenth Amendment). 
91
 See Hearn, supra note 7, at 1141. 
92
 See id. at 1144. Hearn also argues that modern violence against black women is a badge or 
incident of nineteenth-century chattel slavery. Cf. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (arguing that antidiscrimination law 
obscures the interaction between race and sex discrimination for black women). 
93
 See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 456 (Phil. Law 1868) (affirming acquittal of a husband 
in the unprovoked whipping of his wife, on the grounds that state government is subordinate to 
“family government”); see also Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative 
and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) (demonstrating in detail the ways in which repudiation of 
the chastisement regime preserved sexual status hierarchies within families). 
94
 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1865) (statement of Rep. White) (“A husband has 
a right of property in the service of his wife; he has the right to the management of his household 
affairs. . . . All these rights rest upon the same basis as a man’s right of property in the service of 
slaves.”); cf. id. at 242 (statement of Rep. Cox) (“Should we amend the Constitution so as to 
change the relation of parent and child, guardian and ward, husband and wife, the laws of 
inheritance, the laws of legitimacy?”). 
95
 Neuborne, supra note 7, at 102. 
96
 See generally Siegel, supra note 93. 
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or involuntary servitude must involve physical coercion and a captive audience, or 
take literally the absence of a state action requirement—such that the presence of 
applicable state criminal laws is not relevant to whether the challenged conduct is 
unconstitutional—the Thirteenth Amendment becomes at least a generative as the 
Fourteenth. For a judge in search of limiting principles, the Thirteenth 
Amendment is a distraction rather than a solution. 
As in DeShaney, the state action to which VAWA is responsive is obvious 
to anyone looking for it.
97
 As Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in 
Morrison recognizes, the Congress that enacted VAWA compiled a “voluminous” 
record tending to show that gender-related stereotypes held by administrators of 
state criminal justice systems “often result in insufficient investigation and 
prosecution of gender-motivated crime, inappropriate focus on the behavior and 
credibility of the victims of that crime, and unacceptably lenient punishments for 
those who are actually convicted of gender-motivated violence.”98 The Morrison 
majority backgrounds these findings, holding that the federal civil remedy is non-
responsive because it does not call any state officials to account,
99
 but the logic 
that compels this conclusion is obscure.
100
 Imagine if a state discriminatorily 
refused to provide police protection to a predominantly black neighborhood. (That 
is, imagine if a state quite literally denied equal protection of the laws.) Would it 
exceed Congress’s Section 5 authority to authorize federal police to secure the 
area? One might criticize the remedy in VAWA as overbroad, but it is difficult to 
understand the objection that it is not concerned with state action. Anyone 
rejecting this view is even less likely to extend the Thirteenth Amendment to the 
entire field of gender-motivated violence. 
 The contrapositive, logically, is also true. Anyone who accepts the 
Thirteenth Amendment argument would have no trouble accepting the Fourteenth 
Amendment argument. This is why Neuborne, in his testimony, listed four 
independent bases for upholding VAWA: in order, the Commerce Clause, Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and the 
Thirteenth Amendment.
101
 Although we cannot be sure, these appear to be listed 
in order of plausibility.
102
 Likewise, Lawrence Sager has argued that the principle 
of Jones, which permits Congress to address the legacy of slavery, applies equally 
to VAWA and the legacy of sex discrimination via the Fourteenth Amendment, 
                                                 
97
 This is quite apart from the equally obvious relationship between gender-motivated violence and 
the interstate labor market, which is subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. The 
extensive evidence Congress compiled to this effect is summarized at Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628–
34 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
98
 Id. at 620. 
99
 Id. at 626. 
100
 Id. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
101
 See Neuborne, supra note 7, at 87–89. 
102
 Neuborne testified that the Commerce Clause was the easiest ground for decision. See id. at 88. 
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unless Jones has been tacitly overruled by City of Boerne v. Flores:
103
 “Like 
slavery, [the] long history of state-sponsored disablement and injustice [against 
women] has left behind harms that are enduring, pervasive, and tentacular. In this 
respect, the reasoning of Jones is fully apt to [Morrison].”104 One could, in other 
words, make all of Hearn’s and Neuborne’s arguments but ground them in the 
more firmly established jurisprudence of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
* * * 
 
 The claims discussed in this Part follow a similar pattern. Each proposes a 
conceptually available but doctrinally foreign application of the Thirteenth 
Amendment to a problem more commonly discussed under the rubric of other 
constitutional provisions, particularly the Fourteenth Amendment. Each grounds 
its argument in a broad-based form of textualism or originalism. None is likely to 
persuade anyone who finds the present rubrics unavailing and none is likely to be 
adopted by the Supreme Court in the foreseeable future. Should the political 
environment arise to mainstream a Thirteenth Amendment argument against 
abortion restrictions, child abuse, hate speech, or violence against women, that 
environment is equally or more likely to support a Fourteenth Amendment 
argument or, as likely, to obviate the need for constitutional argument altogether. 
 
II 
 
 The legal academy has become something of a whipping boy of late.
105
 
This article does not endorse the view, stated or implied in high-profile attacks on 
legal education, that legal scholarship is without value unless it helps a judge 
resolve cases. I assume, and strongly believe, that good academic scholarship, 
including legal academic scholarship, has intrinsic worth. The arguments of 
Thirteenth Amendment optimists have vastly improved my understanding of the 
history leading up to the Thirteenth Amendment, of the court decisions 
interpreting that Amendment and the political episodes that generated those 
decisions, of the conceptual bounds of the culturally significant institution of 
slavery, of the treatment of women within marital relationships both before and 
after the abolition of rules of coverture. Epistemic value is as good as any, and it 
                                                 
103
 521 U.S. 507 (1995) (limiting the reach of Congress’s Section 5 power to remedies congruent 
and proportional to an identified violation). 
104
 Sager, supra note 16, at 153. 
105
 See David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 
2011, at BU1; David Segal, Law School Economics: Ka-Ching!, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 17, 2011, at 
BU1; David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at BU1; see also 
Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). 
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would be ironic if the pursuit of truth, recognized time and again as a fundamental 
constitutional value,
106
 were deemed worthless unless further instrumental to 
judicial doctrine. Encouraging scholars to advance colorable arguments about the 
text and history of the Thirteenth Amendment not only enriches our collective 
knowledge but also lends substance to vital modes of constitutional argument. 
The practice of constitutional law is no less than the practice of advancing 
arguments from text and history. There is nothing “wrong” with Thirteenth 
Amendment optimism; indeed, there is much to commend it. 
 This gathering’s charge, however, is to discuss the “contemporary 
implications” of the Thirteenth Amendment, and so I am obliged to judge 
Thirteenth Amendment optimism through a more discerning lens. I take the 
amendment’s implications to be measured by its impact on legal doctrine, legal 
practice, or constitutional politics. Part II suggested that the prospects for 
influencing legal doctrine or practice are bleak, but the argument is incomplete. 
Constitutional law can move slowly in our common law system.
107
 Many 
mainstream constitutional arguments were off the wall before they were on it,
108
 
and in the case of the Thirteenth Amendment many arguments were on the wall 
before they were off it. 
This is easier to see when we look for constitutional meaning outside the 
courts and within the nomoi of political and social movements.
109
 That inquiry 
demonstrates that Thirteenth Amendment optimism signifies not new but renewed 
interest in and attention to the amendment. James Gray Pope has shown, for 
example, that the Thirteenth Amendment was a standard tool of pre-New Deal era 
unionist advocacy in favor of congressional legislation to protect labor rights and 
against Lochner-era economic substantive due process jurisprudence.
110
 For these 
advocates, the Thirteenth Amendment proved that labor rights were not mere 
“class legislation,” but were constitutionally inspired.111 The Thirteenth 
                                                 
106
 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1967); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment); 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Regents of 
the University of California, Davis v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). 
107
 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 
(1996). 
108
 In 1991 Warren Burger called the argument for grounding opposition to gun control in the 
Second Amendment “one of the greatest pieces of fraud, I repeat the word ‘fraud,’ on the 
American public by special interest groups that I have ever seen in my lifetime,” MacNeil/Lehrer 
Newshour: First Freedoms (PBS television broadcast Dec. 16, 1991), and in 1989 Robert Bork 
said all state gun control laws were “probably constitutional,” see Claudia Luther, Bork Says State 
Gun Laws Constitutional, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1989, at B5. Cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
561 U.S. 3025 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
109
 I borrow this term from Robert Cover. See Cover, supra note 18. 
110
 See Pope, supra note 24, at 18–22. 
111
 See id. at 22–25. 
 18 
Amendment has also been a prominent location for Executive Branch 
constitutionalism. Risa Goluboff has chronicled the ways in which lawyers in the 
Department of Justice Civil Rights division invoked the Thirteenth Amendment in 
an expanding set of cases in the 1940s, beginning with traditional peonage but 
broadening to encompass other forms of economic coercion.
112
 One must not be 
too quick, then, to universalize the contingent background assumptions of modern 
constitutional practice. As Larry Kramer writes, “work like Pope’s and [William] 
Forbath’s suggests that taking popular constitutionalism seriously might help to 
counter an otherwise unnoticed tendency to perceive the Constitution and its 
possibilities myopically.”113  
It is also too quick, however, to assume that a once fecund but now 
dormant source of law will bloom again solely because of academic interest, and 
there are costs in making the effort. One significant difference between the 1930s 
and 1940s and today is the advent of modern civil rights law.
114
 Thirteenth 
Amendment optimism was a rather different project when segregation was legal; 
when the Bill of Rights remained largely unincorporated against the states; when 
the state action doctrine had not been tamed by Shelley, Katzenbach v. 
McClung,
115
 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
116
 and their progeny; and 
when, more generally, “understandings of civil rights [were] up for grabs.”117 The 
doctrinal resources to achieve Thirteenth Amendment optimism’s ends have 
already been mined. The obstacle to realization of those ends is less a failure of 
constitutional imagination than a failure of constitutional politics. 
                                                 
112
 See Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 
DUKE L.J. 1609, 1647–68 (2001). 
113
 Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959, 980 (2004). 
Koppelman writes:  
 
At the time the [abortion] article was written, not much had been done with the 
Thirteenth Amendment by anyone in the legal academy. It had been a potent source of 
law as recently as the 1970s, but it had since gone out of fashion, and arguments that tried 
to invoke it as a major premise tended to be ruled out of order without a hearing, simply 
because that kind of thing is not done. . . . [But] [t]here is an increasing appreciation that 
the Thirteenth Amendment has potent current applications. 
 
Koppelman, supra note 22, at 238. 
114
 See Goluboff, supra note 112, at 1612 (“[D]uring World War II and the years that followed, . . . 
‘civil rights’ did not refer to a unified, coherent category; the content of the term was open, 
changing, and contradictory, carrying resonances of the past as well as of several possible 
contending futures.”). 
115
 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 as applied to a restaurant near an interstate highway). 
116
 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 as applied to a Georgia hotel). 
117
 Goluboff, supra note 112, at 1613. 
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 Some of the costs are well-documented. There is, for example, a 
credibility cost. Arguments that fail to respect the bounds of conventional usage 
of language and history risk the charge of constitutional perfectionism.
118
 When 
Henry Monaghan coined that phrase in his critique of substantive due process he 
did so in defense of positivism,
119
 but arguments from text and history are hardly 
immune to charges of perfectionism.
120
 There are also several different kinds of 
opportunity costs. First, constructing doctrinal architecture takes time and briefing 
space at the expense of firming up the doctrine already in place. Second, devoting 
resources to manipulation of judicial doctrine distracts the mind from the project 
of altering the political conditions that will ultimately be needed for that doctrine 
to be adopted and to crystallize into lasting precedent. It may be that what Robin 
West calls “adjudicative law” is existentially destined to greet the kinds of 
generative claims advanced by Thirteenth Amendment optimists with 
skepticism.
121
 West writes: 
 
Progressives understand constitutional law as possibilistic and open-
ended, as change rather than regularity and as freedom rather than 
constraint. This understanding of constitutionalism may be right, and it 
may even be right as an account of law, but as an account of adjudicative 
                                                 
118
 See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 358 (1981) 
(arguing that substantive due process proponents believe that “the constitution is essentially 
perfect” in aligning its guarantees of equality and personal autonomy with those “which the 
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 Monaghan, supra note 118, at 360. 
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 The virtual cottage industry in originalist defenses of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483 (1954), provides the most obvious example. See BORK, supra note 19, at 74–83; John 
Harrison, Equality, Race Discrimination, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 CONST. COMM. 243 
(1996); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 
947 (1995). Originalist Steven Calabresi has a long history of refusing the bite the bullet on 
unattractive constitutional outcomes. See Steven G. Calabresi & Julia Rickert, Originalism and 
Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011) (concluding that sex discrimination is “undoubtedly 
unconstitutional” under the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning); Steven G. Calabresi, 
Text, Precedent, and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 655 n.138 (2006) (asserting that Brown was 
correct from an originalist perspective); id. at 656 (arguing that originalism can explain Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). I have personally heard Calabresi defend Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 
497 (1954), by way of the Necessary and Proper Clause, though I have never seen the defense in 
writing and it stands in some tension with Calabresi’s earlier writings. See Steven G. Calabresi, 
Note, A Madisonian Interpretation of the Equal Protection Doctrine, 91 YALE L.J. 1403 (1982). 
121
 Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 714 
(1989). 
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law—of what courts in fact do—it is perverse. Adjudicative law is 
persistently authoritarian: demonstration of the “truth” of legal 
propositions (arguably unlike other truth statements) relentlessly requires 
shows of positive authority. . . . The lesson from this tension between the 
possibilistic Constitution envisioned by progressives and the authoritarian 
structure of adjudicative law is not necessarily that the conventional 
account of adjudicative law as requiring demonstrations of binding 
authority is wrong; rather, the important point may be that the 
identification of constitutional process and choices with the sphere of 
adjudicative rather than legislative legality—with law rather than 
politics—is misguided.122 
 
Thirteenth Amendment optimism, like progressive constitutionalism more 
generally, is aspirational. It seeks to broaden extant understandings of 
constitutional text to permit it to respond to constitutional problems not 
specifically contemplated by its drafters and misunderstood within modern 
discourse. This project may be well-suited to constitutionalism of a sort, but it is 
not well-suited to judicial practice because it turns limitation—the stuff of 
courts—into license—the stuff of legislatures.123 
 All is not lost, however, or so I will argue. The redemptive orientation of 
Thirteenth Amendment optimism may in fact offer the key to its contemporary 
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relevance. The two provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment have, without 
explanation, been treated differently by the Supreme Court. Section 1 has never 
been interpreted to prohibit, of its own accord, “badges and incidents” of 
slavery,
124
 but Section 2 has been said to empower Congress to eradicate such 
badges and incidents almost from the beginning of Thirteenth Amendment 
interpretation. Some Thirteenth Amendment optimists understandably find this 
disjunction troubling,
125
 but separating the two sections permits us to identify the 
amendment with two overlapping but distinct forms of constitutionalism: judicial 
and legislative. As West suggests, legislative constitutionalism is less 
authoritarian than judicial constitutionalism and therefore more compatible with 
progressive constitutional arguments. It also does not suffer from the same 
opportunity costs because Thirteenth Amendment-inspired legislation does not 
require a Thirteenth Amendment judicial justification. Expanding the political 
imagination by way of Thirteenth Amendment optimism may help, in small ways, 
to motivate the political process necessary to craft legislation ultimately grounded 
in other substantive provisions. 
 Two examples will help to clarify the argument. First, recall Pope’s 
discussion of unionist arguments in favor of a Thirteenth Amendment ground for 
Progressive-era labor rights legislation. Those arguments did not succeed in their 
particulars but they were vital to the legislation that eventually passed. The anti-
injunction bill that eventually became the Norris-Laguardia Act was drafted by 
the labor reformer Andrew Furuseth, who specifically invoked the Thirteenth 
Amendment-inspired notion that management cannot have a property right in the 
labor of its workers.
126
 Furuseth likewise urged Senator Robert Wagner to base 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) on the Thirteenth Amendment, and in 
defending the legislation, Wagner drew on principles the labor movement had 
long tied to that provision, namely the right to freedom from economic as well as 
physical coercion. Other proponents of the bill spoke in similar terms.
127
 Labor 
advocates addressed their Thirteenth Amendment claims to Congress rather than 
the Court out of distrust of lawyers
128
 and, importantly, as Forbath notes, because 
they firmly believed that social and economic rights, though constitutionally 
grounded, “did not lend themselves to judicial enforcement.”129  
Congress eventually justified both the Norris-Laguardia Act and the 
NLRA on non-rights-based constitutional provisions, namely the power to control 
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federal jurisdiction and the interstate commerce power. It did so in response to 
political pressure, both from pragmatist Progressive elites like Felix Frankfurter
130
 
and from anti-union Southern interests that controlled vital congressional 
vetogates but formed part of the New Deal coalition.
131
 But the text and history of 
the Thirteenth Amendment became, in Reva Siegel’s words, “the site of 
understandings and practices that authorize, encourage, and empower ordinary 
citizens to make claims on the Constitution’s meaning.”132 
The second example is more familiar to most constitutional lawyers, since 
on its face it represents the most spectacular success of Thirteenth Amendment 
optimism. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 
1982, which prohibits racial discrimination in the transfer of property, applied to 
private residential housing discrimination and, so applied, was valid Thirteenth 
Amendment Section 2 legislation. The Thirteenth Amendment holding in Jones 
was genuinely shocking but the result was expected. The state action doctrine, 
undermined in Shelley, had since been dealt a series of blows so severe that it was 
liable to collapse at the slightest tremor. In Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung 
the Court had permitted Congress to evade state-action-based limitations on 
addressing private discrimination by upholding the legislation under the 
Commerce Clause. Just over a year later, in United States v. Price
133
 and United 
States v. Guest,
134
 decided the same day, the Court held that a statute aimed at 
conspiracies to deprive a person of the exercise of civil rights was valid 
Fourteenth Amendment legislation even as applied to private actors working 
either indirectly or in consort with a state actor ignorant of any discriminatory 
motivation. Although Justice Stewart’s majority opinion in Guest avoided 
deciding the power to enact the statute under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment if it reached purely private action, six members of the Court, over 
two separate concurring opinions, endorsed the view that Congress indeed 
possessed that power.
135
 
Heart of Atlanta Motel and Guest would have been sufficient to ground a 
holding in favor of the Joneses on either Commerce Clause or Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds. The Jones case itself was briefed and argued exclusively on 
statutory and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Harry Blackmun, then an Eighth 
Circuit judge, ruled against Jones but cited numerous cases, including Shelley, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 cases, and Guest, to argue that “the reasoning of the 
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Civil Rights Cases is in the process of reevaluation, if not overruling, and that a 
court may not need to stretch to find state action if appropriate congressional 
legislation is present.”136 Looking beyond doctrine, a constitutional ruling against 
Jones would have seriously called into question the constitutionality of the Fair 
Housing Act, which was enacted just days after oral argument in Jones and whose 
passage was urged by President Johnson amid the rioting following the 
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.
137
 As Gerhard Casper wrote, “[T]he hot 
spring of 1968 was not an easy time to turn down a claim like that of the 
Joneses.”138 
There is little question, then, that assuming section 1982 applied to private 
discrimination in residential housing, the Supreme Court would have upheld its 
constitutionality with or without advancing a Thirteenth Amendment theory. 
Why, then, did the Court base its decision on the Thirteenth Amendment? The 
oral argument in Jones may provide a clue. The Thirteenth Amendment was 
invoked just once in either petitioner’s argument or in the argument of the United 
States as amicus curiae. Its first and only mention came some twelve minutes into 
Samuel Liberman’s argument for petitioner, during the following exchange with 
Justice Stewart, the author of the Jones majority opinion: 
 
Liberman:  In the holdings of this Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan and 
United States v. Price and the Guest case this limiting 
interpretation of the power of Congress under the 
Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 has been abandoned,
139
 
so that any dictum . . . . 
 
Stewart: Except that this statute was enacted under the aegis of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, wasn’t it? 
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Liberman:  Originally it was enacted under the Thirteenth Amendment 
and reenacted . . . . 
 
Stewart:  Reenacted after the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 
Liberman:  That’s right. 
 
Stewart:  Its original passage was under the aegis of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. 
 
Liberman:  Yes. I was referring to the force, if any, of the dictum in 
Hurd v. Hodge, which I think did perhaps imply some 
limitation due to a Fourteenth Amendment construction 
which I was urging has been abandoned since that time by 
this Court in the Guest case and the Price case. 
 
Stewart:  But if this were valid legislation under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, it escapes me why we have to worry about the 
Fourteenth Amendment and any limitations contained in it. 
 
Liberman:  It’s our opinion that we don’t have to, that we’re really 
engaged in a question of statutory interpretation. 
 
Stewart:  And the power of Congress under the Thirteenth 
Amendment to enact this legislation. 
 
Liberman:  Yes.
140
 
 
It appears that Stewart, unique among the Justices, believed both that section 1982 
applied to private housing discrimination and that Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment could not be applied to such discrimination.
141
 A Fourteenth 
Amendment holding in Jones would likely have garnered six votes, but Justice 
Stewart’s opinion in Jones garnered seven, all but those of Justices Harlan and 
White, who dissented on prudential grounds (because of the recent passage of the 
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Fair Housing Act) and who expressed deep skepticism about the Court’s statutory 
holding.
142
 
The Thirteenth Amendment analysis in Jones, unnecessary either to the 
result in Jones or to the subsequent constitutionality of the Fair Housing Act, has 
done little important judicial work since. The closest we get is Runyon v. 
McCrary,
143
 which upheld the constitutionality of the contracting section of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 as applied to racial discrimination in private school 
admissions, and Griffin v. Breckenridge,
144
 which affirmed congressional power 
under Section 2 to pass the provision of the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act that forbid 
conspiracies to deprive persons of equal protection of the laws or equal privileges 
and immunities.
145
 Runyon strays at least as far as Jones from the original 
expected application of the Thirteenth Amendment but, like Jones, it could easily 
have been justified under the Commerce Clause or (but for Jones’s missed 
opportunity) under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Griffin Court 
concluded that an earlier construction of the Ku Klux Klan Act, in Collins v. 
Hardyman,
146
 that held that it did not apply to private conspiracies was not 
binding because it was grounded needlessly in constitutional avoidance. Justice 
Stewart wrote: “it is clear, in the light of the evolution of decisional law in the 
years that have passed since that case was decided, that many of the constitutional 
problems there perceived simply do not exist.”147 The Thirteenth Amendment 
holding in Griffin is far narrower than the holding in Jones (as evidenced by the 
Burger Court’s unanimity on this point), and there is little reason to believe the 
former holding required the latter. The facts of Griffin involved a vicious 
premeditated assault on a group of black men traveling in Mississippi, on the 
(mistaken) belief that they were civil rights workers; this, more than private 
housing discrimination, is a “badge or incident” of slavery if ever there was one. 
Post-Jones, Section 1 claims have continued their nearly unbroken futility 
streak outside the context of peonage. Thus, in Palmer v. Thompson,
148
 decided 
one week after Griffin, the Court rejected a Thirteenth Amendment argument that 
the city of Jackson, Mississippi was not permitted to shutter its public swimming 
pools in response to a desegregation order, saying that the argument “would 
severely stretch [the amendment’s] short simple words and do violence to its 
history.”149 In City of Memphis v. Greene,150 the Court rejected the argument that 
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closing a street that traversed a white neighborhood to prevent predominantly 
black motorists from passing through violated either section 1982 or Section 1 of 
the Thirteenth Amendment. But the most frustrating recent decision for those who 
seek an expansive Thirteenth Amendment might be United States v. Kozminski,
151
 
in which the Court interpreted the phrase “involuntary servitude” as used in 
federal statutes preventing conspiracies to deprive civil rights as not 
contemplating psychological coercion but only “the use or threatened use of 
physical or legal coercion.”152 Kozminski was a statutory case but the Court 
surveyed its Thirteenth Amendment cases to reach its decision. Justice O’Connor 
cited favorably to the dicta in the 1916 case of Butler v. Perry, which upheld a 
state law requiring uncompensated citizen labor on public roads, that the “general 
intent” behind the words “involuntary servitude” was “to prohibit conditions akin 
to African slavery.”153 
Under the circumstances it is fair to ask whether, from a progressive 
perspective, Jones was a mistake. The political process that produced the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Housing Act had settled on viable doctrinal hooks 
to which the Court had tentatively provided its blessing. But rather than accept the 
outcome of that process, the Jones Court struck out, idiosyncratically, on its own. 
Jones has virtually no significant doctrinal progeny and represents a missed 
opportunity to build upon the slow erosion of the Fourteenth Amendment state 
action doctrine that, by 1968, was nearly complete. Dealing in counterfactuals is 
always perilous, but it seems reasonable to say that, had the Jones Court upheld 
section 1982 as a valid exercise of Section 5 authority, the Runyon Court might 
have relied on the Commerce Clause, thereby complicating the later anti-
progressive holding in United States v. Lopez,
154
 and the Morrison Court would 
have had to overrule Jones (and perhaps Runyon) to reach its result. A Fourteenth 
Amendment holding in Jones might also have emboldened Congress to more 
aggressively test the boundaries of its expanding authority over private action. 
 By contrast, the labor movement might have earned a victory, despite 
itself, in failing to persuade Congress and the Court to rely more explicitly on the 
Thirteenth Amendment in passing the Norris-Laguardia Act and the Wagner Act. 
Although the decisions in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States
155
 and 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.
156
 cast doubt on the viability of the Commerce Clause 
as a jurisdictional tie to labor relations, the Court famously reversed course in 
                                                 
151
 487 U.S. 931 (1988). 
152
 Id. at 944. 
153
 Id. at 942 (quoting Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332–33 (1916)). 
154
 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
155
 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
156
 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 27 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
157
 Would the post-Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp. Court have blessed a Thirteenth Amendment-based NLRA? Felix 
Frankfurter called Furuseth’s Thirteenth Amendment arguments “too silly for any 
practical lawyer’s use.”158 It is difficult to imagine that the Roosevelt Court, 
packed with like-minded New Deal pragmatists, would have shepherded into 
being a Labor Constitution protective of social and economic rights in the teeth of 
the kind of politics that produced the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.
159
 
 These two examples suggest that the most productive use of Thirteenth 
Amendment optimism lies not in encouraging appellate lawyers and judges to 
incorporate Thirteenth Amendment arguments into briefing and judicial decisions 
but rather in stimulating a political movement to broaden its imagination and 
understand its ends in Thirteenth Amendment terms. The Thirteenth Amendment 
may be especially useful for this purpose because it may be read to embody a 
national commitment to social and economic justice. This is its comparative 
advantage over competing constitutional rights frames. Its Section 2—which on 
this view is far more important than Section 1
160—may therefore be read to 
burden Congress with a constitutional responsibility to root out pervasive and 
demeaning inequality and subjugation even in the absence of local governmental 
action.
161
 I have argued elsewhere that progressives are less apt than conservatives 
to structure their policy demands as constitutional imperatives, and are therefore 
less successful at motivating their base to seek to influence constitutional 
politics.
162
 Thirteenth Amendment optimism can be a vehicle for doing so and 
may thereby, indirectly, influence the political process in ways that lead to 
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significant constitutional change. That change need not be grounded expressly in 
Thirteenth Amendment language, and indeed, the radical promise of the 
amendment makes that possibility rather unlikely. 
 
III 
 
 Part I provided four examples of Thirteenth Amendment optimism and 
argued that, in each case, the arguments advanced were too fanciful to be 
accepted by a court, too radical to persuade opponents of the targeted policy 
outcome, and not needed to persuade policy proponents. Part II outlined some 
potential benefits and costs to advancing arguments of this character and 
suggested that the best way to preserve the benefits while mitigating the costs was 
to use Thirteenth Amendment optimism to motivate politics rather than directly to 
influence judicial doctrine. This Part applies the insights of Part II to the examples 
in Part I. It should be clear by now that what each case is missing is not an 
argument—these are in abundance—but a movement fit to integrate those 
arguments into higher law. Thirteenth Amendment optimism will not itself 
perform the integrative work but it may be able to help build the movement. 
 The right to terminate a pregnancy is, at its core, a negative right; so long 
as we are speaking the language of negative rights, Thirteenth Amendment 
discourse stands at a comparative disadvantage. It is particularly unhelpful to 
compare pregnant women to slaves or involuntary servants if the goal is to reach 
consensus with political opponents of abortion rights, whose likely reaction to 
comparing a fetus to a slave master is horror. The Thirteenth Amendment ends 
reproductive rights conversations that any viable political process must facilitate. 
To the extent that abortion-related rights may be framed in positive terms, there 
may be a role for Thirteenth Amendment optimism, but it is bound to be limited 
for the reasons just discussed. One possibility is in advocacy over access of low-
income women to family planning services, which is hampered by state and 
federal laws that channel public funding away from abortion-related services.
163
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 The other three examples from Part I—child abuse, hate speech, and 
domestic violence—differ from abortion rights in that they involve positive rights 
to state protection from private aggressors who, unlike fetuses, are not likely to be 
viewed with sympathy by anyone within the constitutional conversation. For child 
abuse and domestic violence, the objection to constitutionalized rights for victims 
of these acts is largely grounded in federalism rather than solicitude for the 
competing rights of other private actors.
164
 For hate speech, the objection is 
indeed grounded in competing constitutional rights, but they are those of an 
unpopular rights bearer. The Thirteenth Amendment may therefore serve as a 
somewhat more promising political frame for these issues than for abortion rights. 
There is no reason, in principle, why Thirteenth Amendment analysis 
cannot inform the hate speech debate in ways that can influence the politics 
surrounding the issue. Previous efforts to integrate Fourteenth Amendment 
analysis into the constitutional conversation over hate speech have suffered from 
the familiar problem of characterizing private actions as state-sanctioned. The 
Thirteenth Amendment suggests an affirmative right on the part of African-
Americans, at a minimum, to be free from the race-based intimidation 
characteristic of the antebellum South, even if that intimidation is accomplished 
(as it often was then) through speech. The difficulty, as ever, is in defining both 
the class of persons who may benefit from a Thirteenth Amendment analysis and 
the class who may be disadvantaged by it. In a rapidly diversifying nation, is it 
either appropriate or politically feasible to limit hate speech legislation to 
previously enslaved groups like blacks or, arguably, women? Historically, among 
the biggest opponents of hate speech legislation have been civil rights groups for 
whom incautious language is necessary to get their point across.
165
 Would 
Thirteenth Amendment-based hate speech legislation be asymmetrical as to 
race?
166
 Not if it wants to pass Congress. 
The federal hate crimes law passed in 1969 reaches beyond race, to 
religion and national origin, and the amendment to that law passed explicitly on 
Thirteenth Amendment grounds—the Matthew Shepard Act—covers hate crimes 
based on gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, and disability.
167
 The original 
bill applied to hate crimes that interfered with federally protected activities, but 
the amendment eliminated that jurisdictional requirement. It is not obvious that 
the amendment could have been passed without Thirteenth Amendment optimism, 
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but it would be surprising indeed if it were to be upheld as applied to crimes 
against gays or transgendered people on Thirteenth Amendment grounds. The 
political environment in which that holding is plausible has no need for Thirteenth 
Amendment optimism, but the legislative mobilization that created the Act may 
well have required it. 
 Among the most resourceful and promising uses of Thirteenth 
Amendment optimism was, as described, in contemplation of VAWA. In his 
testimony Neuborne offered a Thirteenth Amendment framework that, among 
others, could justify a political intervention on behalf of victims of gender-
motivated violence. A Thirteenth Amendment argument situates VAWA or its 
equivalent not just as constitutionally permitted—proponents needed no such 
persuasion—but as constitutionally mandated, in order to combat ineffectual 
modern state-based remedies for acts that were historically shielded by state laws 
that sought to preserve a master-servant spousal relationship. VAWA in fact 
passed Congress with bipartisan support and, although the civil redress 
component was defeated in Morrison,
168
 the broader Act, which funds support 
services and provides training programs to benefit victims of gender-related 
violence, remains in place today. 
 We might imagine a parallel effort in support of a “Violence Against 
Children Act,” on behalf of victims of child abuse. Child welfare and safety is a 
                                                 
168
 It might be argued, then, that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding the scope of 
congressional enforcement provisions undermines the argument that the best outlet for Thirteenth 
Amendment optimism runs through Section 2. The dichotomy I have suggested between the 
relative narrowness of Section 1 and the relative generativity of Section 2 may be one that the 
Court refuses to appreciate. But even apart from the unsettled application of City of Boerne v. 
Flores to the Thirteenth Amendment, see Jennifer Mason McAward, The Scope of Congress’s 
Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Power After City of Boerne v. Flores, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 
77 (2010); Sager, supra note 16, I do not view Flores and its progeny as a significant hindrance to 
this article’s claims for two principal reasons. First, the paper’s chief claim, again, is not that 
legislation should formally be premised on the Thirteenth Amendment or that judges will or 
should revitalize Section 2 jurisprudence; it is rather that such argument can provide a 
constitutional frame to claims involving positive rights, and thereby invigorate legislative 
advocacy. The jurisdictional hooks, or lack thereof, that motivate members of Congress need not 
constrain either federal judges or the Office of the Solicitor General. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819) (upholding the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States 
without reference to any jurisdictional bases mentioned in the statute of incorporation). But see 
Florida v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1313–20 (11th Cir. 2011) (relying 
on text and legislative history to determine whether the Affordable Care Act’s minimum coverage 
provision is a “tax” or a “penalty”). Indeed, some of the legislative proposals that Thirteenth 
Amendment optimism can motivate, such as a relaxation on Title X funding restrictions, require 
no constitutional justification. Second, even if Thirteenth Amendment Section 2 arguments lose in 
federal court, a fight that situates progressives as adhering to the will of the people in the face of 
an “activist” Supreme Court is one that progressives should, relatively speaking, be willing to 
have. 
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frequent topic of federal legislative proposals, but it is uncommon for such 
proposals to address domestic violence as such against children. For example, 
Senator Barbara Boxer of California has twice introduced a bill with the precise 
title just proposed.
169
 The Violence Against Children Act would provide federal 
funding to investigate, prosecute, and prevent crimes involving children. At this 
level of generality, it is difficult to justify such an act under the Thirteenth 
Amendment; the argument that violence against children generally reflects the 
lingering effects of a slavery regime is not credible. The politics of this effort are 
therefore more difficult than for VAWA. Many of the arguments once used to 
resist laws against spousal abuse—e.g., that it intrudes upon the sovereignty of the 
man over his family affairs—have analogues in the debate over child abuse. 
Corporal punishment of children remains popular, indeed immune from Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny,
170
 and even child victim advocates concede the need for a 
residuum of parental control over child discipline and socialization.
171
 Still, 
VAWA points the way forward in the use of Thirteenth Amendment arguments in 
this domain; the Thirteenth Amendment can emphasize that, whatever the 
ultimate structure of a regulatory response to child abuse, legislative silence is not 
an option. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Thirteenth Amendment is unusual in several ways that make it a 
popular location for creative constitutional argument. Virtually unique among the 
Constitution’s rights-conferring provisions, it lacks a state action requirement. Its 
bold prohibition on the “existence” of slavery burdens both states and the federal 
government with a responsibility to prosecute certain affronts to personal 
freedom. It nominally remains the case, moreover, that the Supreme Court’s 
decisional law grants Congress broad authority to eliminate the “badges and 
incidents” of slavery. Whatever such badges and incidents include, Jones makes 
clear that they are not nearly exhausted by practices that approximate chattel 
slavery. 
 As Daniel Farber writes, however, “there is something inherently suspect 
about an interpretation so clever that it never would have occurred to the speaker 
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or the audience.”172 This, in a nutshell, is the difficulty with Thirteenth 
Amendment optimism. Whatever original meaning originalism means in theory, it 
does not easily justify an interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment that is 
inconsistent with how everyone at the time, and indeed the vast majority of people 
today, would have expected it to apply. Thirteenth Amendment optimism is, 
largely for this reason, unlikely to persuade skeptics or to infiltrate judicial 
doctrine as such. Still, there may be limited ways to put the unique features of the 
amendment to work for Thirteenth Amendment optimists. The capacity of the 
Thirteenth Amendment to constitutionalize affirmative rights may lend 
constitutional heft to what would otherwise be policy arguments, and may thereby 
motivate advocates to push legislation inspired (if not ultimately justified) by the 
amendment’s special, perhaps too special, promise. 
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